We investigate how social status concerns may affect voters' preferences for redistribution. Social status is given by a voter's relative standing in two dimensions: consumption and social class. By affecting the distribution of consumption levels, redistribution modifies the weights attached to the two dimensions. Thus redistribution not only transfers resources from the rich to the poor, but it also amplifies or reduces the importance of social class differences. We show that social status concerns simultaneously lead some members of the working class to oppose redistribution and some members of the socio-economic elites to favor it. We prove that these effects result in an increase in polarization concerning redistributive policies. Finally, we show that social comparisons give rise to interclass coalitions of voters that, despite having different monetary interests, support the same tax rate.
Introduction
Redistributive policies are one of the main issues in any political system and voters' attitudes toward such policies have been vastly studied by economic and political science scholars. Standard models of political economy indicate income as the main determinant of voters' preferences toward redistribution. This is "economic voting" (Romer, 1975 , Roberts, 1977 , Meltzer and Richard, 1981 : low-income voters should favor greater redistribution (hence, tax rates) and high-income voters should oppose it. However, from an empirical point of view, the negative correlation between income and support for redistribution is far from perfect. 1 For instance, Gilens (1999) and Fong (2001) show that substantial fractions of poor individuals are less in favor of redistribution than what their material interest would suggest. Similarly, a significant share of the socioeconomic elites support high levels of redistribution, even though this hurts them from a monetary point of view.
Although these deviations from economic voting seem the two sides of the same coin, the literature has mostly studied each of them in isolation. Papers that focus on agents' expectations about future prospects (Piketty, 1995, Bénabou and Ok, 2001, Bénabou and  Tirole, 2006a) can easily rationalize the first discrepancy (members of the working class voting against high taxes because they expect that they will soon climb the social ladder). However, they have harder times in explaining the second deviation (members of the elite favoring high taxes) since it seems unlikely that rich voters may simultaneously be influenced by prospects of downward mobility. On the other hand, papers that abandon the setting of fully rational and self-interested voters and implicitly or explicitly rely on some notion of fairness, inequity aversion, or solidarity (Corneo and Grüner, 2000 , Fong, 2001 , Luttmer, 2001 , Glazer, 2004, Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014) can explain why the elites 1 See Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Costa-Font and Cowell (2015) for recent reviews. More in details, discrepancies from pure economic voting have been rationalized by highlighting the role of individual histories Spilimbergo, 2014, Fisman et al., 2015) , race (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) , culture Glazer, 2004, Luttmer and Singhal, 2011) , beliefs concerning the returns to effort (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006a) , subjective assessments of the fairness of market outcomes (Fong, 2001, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) , prospects of social mobility (Piketty, 1995 , Bénabou and Ok, 2001 , Acharya, 2014 , issues of group loyalty and social identity (Corneo and Grüner, 2000 , Luttmer, 2001 , Corneo and Grüner, 2002 , Shayo, 2009 , Cervellati et al., 2010 , or the structure of inequality (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011) . support high levels of redistribution. However, they cannot easily rationalize why nonnegligible fractions of the less well-off dislike high taxes, unless they assume that these individuals have wrong perceptions about relative standings in society.
In this paper, we introduce a model that simultaneously rationalizes both deviations described above, while still postulating that voters are self-interested. This is done by assuming that voters' preferences toward redistribution are shaped not only by monetary payoffs, but also by status-seeking considerations. 2 In our model, voters differ across two dimensions: productivity and social class. Productivity determines the voter's income and, ultimately, his level of consumption. Social class captures those factors that are associated with the voter's socioeconomic background and affect his social status even after controlling for the income effects they may entail.
Examples include his educational and cultural level (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) or the social network that he inherits from his family (Lin, 1999) . In line with standard indexes of socioeconomic status (see Hollingshead, 2011) , we assume that social status is a multidimensional attribute that is jointly determined by an individual's level of consumption and social class (see Gilman, 1981 , Henrich and Boyd, 2008 , and Dow and Reed, 2013 historical and evolutionary arguments that testify the salience of social class in determining social status).
Formally, we define social status as a weighted average of the voter's standing in the two dimensions and we assume that the larger the (positive or negative) distance between the voter's relevant characteristics and the average levels in the population, the larger the (positive or negative) effects on his well-being. We thus follow the well-known "Keep up with the Joneses" formulation (Clark and Oswald, 1996, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004) . However, our model displays two distinguishing features. First, as already discussed, social status is a multidimensional attribute. Second, we let the weights that define the relevance of consumption and social class to be endogenously determined. In particular, as the disper-sion in one of the two dimensions of heterogeneity increases, the weight associated to such dimension increases and the weight of the other dimension goes down. Put differently, the more disperse consumption (respectively, social class) is in the population, the more visible are the differences in relative consumption (social class), the larger is the relative impact that consumption (social class) has in determining social status. This assumption is in line with the social rank hypothesis discussed in the psychological and sociological literature and finds empirical support in Walasek and Brown (2015, 2016) , which shows a positive correlation between income inequality and status-seeking behavior. 3 It is also coherent with the emerging literature on the causes and consequences of "status anxiety" (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009 , Layte, 2012 , Layte and Whelan, 2014 , Dehley and Dragolov, 2014 . Because in our model the dispersion of consumption in the society is affected by the tax rate, the previous assumptions imply that taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor, but it also modifies the relative importance of the two dimensions of social comparison. Due to this latter effect, social elites (low social classes) may use taxation as a strategic tool to preserve the advantage (eliminate the disadvantage) they have in terms of social class. We label such strategic use of taxation social-class voting.
In line with this insight and with the motivating evidence reported in Section 2, our first set of results highlights how social concerns influence individual attitudes toward redistribution. On the one hand, social comparisons over consumption amplify economic voting with low-income individuals demanding even higher levels of redistribution, while the opposite holds true for high-income individuals. On the other hand, due to comparisons over social classes, social-class voting pushes individuals in high (low) classes to favor (oppose) raises in taxation. When status concerns over social class dominate those over consumption, affluent individuals in high social classes may support relatively high levels of redistribution.
Interestingly, such support does not stem from fairness or altruistic consideration, neither it emerges as a form of noblesse oblige. Instead, it is purely strategic and self-interested, as it allows members of the social elite to differentiate themselves from the nouveau riche. 4 Sym- 3 For further evidence, see also Paskov et al., 2013 and Jin et al., 2014. 4 Certainly, members of the elite may support redistributive policies also for other reasons. Some of these metrically, relatively low productive individuals in low social classes may be less favorable to redistribution than what economic voting would dictate.
Our second result proves that polarization of individual preferences toward redistribution increases with the relevance of status concerns (also this pattern is compatible with the evidence reported in Section 2). Importantly, this is true independently of which of the two dimensions of social comparisons (consumption or social class) receive the highest weight.
Indeed, as the importance of status concerns increases, both economic voting and social-class voting get amplified. High productive individuals in low social classes thus more strongly oppose redistribution, while low productive individuals in high social classes become more favorable to it yielding an increase in redistribution.
Finally, we study how individual preferences aggregate. If voters' utility functions are strictly concave in taxation, we characterize interclass coalitions of voters sharing the same preferred level of redistribution. For any level of redistribution, these coalitions are composed of relatively less productive voters in low social classes and relatively more productive voters in high social classes. When the relevance of social concerns is not too high, these coalitions (together with the single-crossing property embedded in our model) further allow us to collapse one of the two dimensions of voters' heterogeneity and to characterize with a system of two equations in two unknowns the unique equilibrium tax rate in a model of Downsian electoral competition. We then discuss how this tax rate varies with the overall importance of social concerns.
Our paper investigates the relationship between status-seeking behavior and preferences for redistribution. In this respect, it is related to recent papers by Levy and Razin (2015) and Koenig et al. (2017) .
reasons may be non-strategic. For instance, affluent individuals may enjoy warm-glow effects, comply to ethical or religious principles, or perhaps feel guilty for the size or the source of their wealth. Education may also play a role through its influence on political preferences: some members of the elite may have acquired a taste for solidarity by having achieved high levels of education or having attended certain institutions. Other motives can instead be strategic. For instance, elite members may want to keep the level of inequality in the society under control such as to reduce the risk of revolutions against the status quo (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000) . However, while these explanations can rationalize why the elite may favor redistribution, they have more difficulties in explaining why, at the same time, members of the lowest classes may oppose it. Our model rationalizes both patterns simultaneously. Levy and Razin (2015) study preferences for redistribution in a setting where individuals positively sort according to income. In their model, agents interact only with individuals that belong to the same "club", with more prestigious clubs being more rewarding but also more costly to join (examples include the choice of a child's school or the marriage market).
When income inequality is high, individuals in the middle class have strong incentives to sort so to avoid mixing with the poor. Thus, to preserve the benefits of sorting, they may oppose redistribution despite having an income below the mean. At the opposite, when income inequality is low, the benefits from sorting are low too. As a result, middle class members may support higher redistribution even though their income may be above the average. Compared to Levy and Razin (2015) , our model starts from similar premises: by decreasing income inequality, redistribution impacts on agents' well-being not only because it affects their disposable income but also because it triggers some additional "social" effects.
In Levy and Razin (2015) , inequality modifies the incentives to sort; in our model, inequality affects the weights that define an agent's social status. Differently from Levy and Razin (2015) , we exploit multidimensional heterogeneity to show that the change in social weights can rationalize both deviations from economic voting simultaneously, within the same society and holding fixed the income distribution. redistribution. Second, although in both models the coalition of voters supporting a given policy can be heterogeneous in terms of income, our setting also allows voters with the same income but belonging to different classes to support different levels of redistribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some motivating evidence.
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 focuses on voters' preferred tax rate. Section 5 studies the aggregation of preferences. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Motivating Evidence
As discussed in the Introduction, the literature has highlighted two deviations from economic voting: not all low-income individuals support redistribution and not all highincome individuals oppose it. Using the 2016 European Social Survey dataset (henceforth ESS16), Table 1 reports the fraction of people who support government's intervention aimed at reducing inequality as a function of the household income decile of the respondent. 5 In line with economic voting, this fraction decreases as we ascend the income ladder. However, roughly 20% of the respondents that belong to households with income below the median do not favor such intervention, while more than 60% of individuals belonging to households with income above the median support it. Thus, the percentage of people who do not align with economic voting is sizable. To delve more on these discrepancies from economic voting, Table 2 runs an ordered probit regression using the degree of of agreement/disagreement with the statement "Government should reduce differences in income levels" as the dependent variable. Four patterns stand out linking income, social status concerns and attitudes towards redistribution.
First, economic voting emerges in all model specifications: rich individuals (Variable
High Income equal to 1) are less favorable to government intervention than poor individuals.
Other variables that are likely to be positively correlated with current or lifetime income 5 All the data that we report in this section come from waves 4-8 of the ESS16 dataset and refer to individuals in the age range 26-64. Observations from waves 1-3 were excluded to avoid inconsistencies in the measurement of household income. Enlarging the age range to include younger and older individuals leads to similar results. See the data appendix for more details. (College and College Father ) also impact negatively on attitudes toward redistribution. 6 Second, social status concerns affect preferences for redistribution. As shown in model (i), individuals who think that being high-achievers is important, 7 are less likely to favor government intervention, even after controlling for measures of lifetime income, age (Age) and self-declared political position (Left-Right Scale). On the contrary individuals who value traditions and customs are more favorable to redistribution. 8 Third, there is a positive correlation between the self-assessed importance of success and social recognition and the strength of economic voting. Indeed, as shown in model (ii), 9 Insofar parents' education influences the respondent's social standing even after controlling for income effects (say, it affects both his income and his social network or cultural level) and the importance of traditions proxies the importance of social classes, this is suggestive of social-class voting: redistribution receives stronger support among the elites who value social background more than individual achievements.
As discussed above, model (ii) hints at the fact that polarization in redistributive preferences between the rich and the poor is higher among individuals who care about social 7 Dummy variable Success Important equals 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement: "It is important to be successful and that others recognize achievements". 8 Dummy variable Tradition Important equals 1 if the respondent agrees with the statement: "It is important to follow traditions and customs". 9 Although the coefficient for respondents who do not have a college educated father is more negative than the one for those who have a college educated father, which is in line with the model we present below, this difference is not statistically significant. recognition. To gather additional evidence, we consider four sub-populations within the ESS16 dataset: (i) low income individuals who deem success recognition important, (ii) high income individuals who deem success recognition important, (iii) low income individual who do not deem success recognition important, and (iv) high income individuals who do not deem success recognition important. We then compute the average preference for redistribution within each of these four sub-populations and we compare the difference between the first two averages (in Table 3 , we label this difference "SR") with the difference between the second two averages ("No SR"). If status concerns polarize preferences, we should expect the first difference to be larger than the second. Table 3 shows that this is indeed the case in the overall ESS16 dataset as well as in 19 out of 30 countries. 10 In the next section, we introduce a model that rationalizes the empirical patterns that we just highlighted. The key mechanism relies on the fact that taxation plays a role in determining individuals' social status and may thus reinforce economic voting and give rise to social-class voting.
The Model
A society is made by a unit mass of citizens. Citizens are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productivity and social class. Productivity is represented by the parameter θ ∈
As explained in the Introduction, a citizen's social class captures the set of socioeconomic characteristics that affect the individual's social standing even after controlling for his productivity/income (e.g., his level of education or the social capital he inherited from his parents). Although we consider social class as the second dimension that determines voters' social standings, our model is general enough to potentially accommodate other characteristics. Examples may include age, IQ, health, ethnicity, height, beauty. 11 We focus on social class both because of its importance in determining social status (see Gilman, 1981, Henrich and Boyd, 2008 , and Dow and Reed, 2013, for historical and evolutionary arguments that testify this salience), 12 and because some of these other factors can be incorporated in our definition of social class.
Each citizen is thus characterized by the pair (θ, k) ∈ Θ × K = T , which we refer to as the citizen's type. Types are distributed in the population according to the joint cumulative density function F (θ, k), with pdf f (θ, k), that we assume to be positive for all (θ, k). Marginal distributions over Θ and K are denoted with F θ (θ) and F k (k). Let θ = [θ min ,θmax] θdF θ (θ) be the average productivity in the population and θ m be the median 11 See Persson and Tabellini, 2002, for a model in which age, together with income, influences preferences for redistribution. For these alternative characteristics to be socially valuable, they must be publicly observable or easily inferable. Moreover, to fit into our model, they should also be exogenous and the government should be unable to tax them directly. 12 According to these evolutionary explanations the social class of an individual affects his ranking in society, hence his mating possibilities and offspring's prospects. kmax] kdF k (k) be the average social class and k m be the median social class, F k (k m ) = 1 − F k (k m ) = 1/2. In line with the empirical evidence, we assume that the median productivity is below the average
Citizens inelastically supply one unit of labor in a perfectly competitive labor market.
Labor yields an output equal to the citizen's productivity and the price of such output is normalized to 1. Then, in exchange of his labor, type (θ, k) receives a wage equal to θ.
The government taxes income through a proportional tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1]. Tax revenues are then used to finance the provision of a lump-sum monetary transfer g to all citizens.
Borrowing is not allowed. Therefore, the tax rate τ and the transfer g must satisfy the government budget constraint: g ≤ τ θ.
The level of consumption of type (θ, k) and the average level of consumption in the population are thus respectively given by:
(1)
Taxes have distortionary effects that negatively affect all citizens. 13 These deadweight losses can capture distortions in the endogenous labor supply of individuals or in their investment decisions and can be microfounded accordingly. Formally, they are represented by a strictly increasing and strictly convex function, (·) : [0, 1] → R + with d (τ )/dτ > 0 and d 2 (τ )/dτ 2 > 0. We further assume that d (0)/dτ = 0 and d (1)/dτ > θ − θ min . This guarantees that, absent social concerns, all voters have a preferred level of taxation below one. The consumption utility of individuals is given by:
Importantly, citizens care not only about their consumption utility, but also about their social status. A citizen's social status is determined by his standing in terms of consumption and social class. In particular, the social status of an individual with type (θ, k) is captured by a function S c − c, k − k . The function S (·, ·) : R × R → R is strictly increasing in both its arguments and such that S (0, 0) = 0. Intuitively, the social status of an individual is higher (lower), the larger is the positive (negative) gap between the agent's attributes (his level of consumption and his social class) and the average values in the population. 14 Then:
The parameter η ≥ 0 captures the overall importance of social status considerations, while W c ∈ [0, 1] and W k ∈ [0, 1] denote the relative weights of consumption and social class in determining status. We normalize weights so that they add up to one, W c + W k = 1.
In line with the literature linking income inequality, status-seeking behavior and status anxiety (cf. Introduction), we let W c and W k be increasing in the level of dispersion of the relevant variable. Thus, as the dispersion in consumption levels widens (respectively, shrinks), the importance of consumption in determining the agent's overall status increases (respectively, decreases). The same is true for social class. Formally:
where σ c is the standard deviation of consumption in the population, σ k is the standard deviation of social class in the population, and λ > 0 is a rescaling factor that makes the two standard deviations comparable. Our analysis goes through if we assume other functional forms for the social weights as long as an increase in the dispersion in one dimension has the joint effect of increasing the weight on such dimension and decreasing the weight on the other dimension. 15 
Social Concerns and Individual Preferences
A citizen's total utility is given by the sum of consumption utility (3) and status-seeking considerations (4) . Formally, the utility of type (θ, k) is given by:
where the second equality follows from
The pairs (τ, g) that maximize (6) subject to g ≤ τ θ are the preferred policies of voter
Obviously, such policies satisfy the budget constraint with equality. Thus, from now on, we will focus on the optimal tax rate only. It is immediate to verify that τ * (θ, k) is non-empty, compact and upperhemicontinuous. When τ * (θ, k) is a singleton, we abuse notation and write τ * (θ, k) to denote its unique value. Moreover, to simplify the exposition, our discussion in the main text assumes that the set of maximizers is a singleton for all voters. None of the results we provide hinges on this simplification. To highlight the
In what follows, it is convenient to rescale types so that they represent distances from the population averages. Thus, each voter (θ, k) is identified by
We denote the joint distribution of (θ d , k d ) with F d (θ d , k d ) and its pdf with f d (θ d , k d ). 16 We 15 Say that an increase in σ c was only to raise W c . Then, social concerns would amplify economic voting but social-class voting would not arise. Moreover, the increase in σ c would also simultaneously increase the overall importance of social concerns, something that in our model is instead captured by the parameter η. 16 The distribution is easily derived from F (θ, k) and has support [θ d,min ,
can then classify citizens in four different groups:
i. The working class. These are voters who are below the average both in terms of productivity and social class, θ d ≤ 0 and k d ≤ 0.
ii. The nouveau riche. These are voters who are more productive than the average, but belong to low social classes, θ d > 0 and k d ≤ 0.
iii. The new poors. These are voters who are less productive than the average, but belong to a relatively high social class, θ d ≤ 0 and k d > 0.
iv. The elite. These are voters who are above the average both in terms of productivity and social class, θ d > 0 and k d > 0.
Substituting for the government's budget constraint, we can write the first and second derivative of (6) with respect to the tax rate as follows:
Expression (7) Furthermore, the distortionary effects of taxation (−d (τ )/dτ ) push against high levels of taxation. The second effect captures the impact of social concerns (the third term in (7)).
Since an increase in τ reduces the dispersion in net income, it reduces the standard deviation For the nouveau riche and the new poors, it could be either convex or concave. 17 Starting from this baseline, tax distortions introduce concavity with respect to taxation. In Section 5, we exploit this fact to aggregate individual preferences.
We can now characterize the preferred level of taxation of generic type (θ d , k d ). As a first step, consider the limit case in which social concerns do not exist (η = 0). Individuals then follow pure economic voting and thus trade off their private marginal benefit from the redistributive scheme against marginal tax distortions. We refer to this situation as the benchmark case, indexed by B. is more productive so that he does not gain from redistribution. It follows that his preferred tax level, τ * (0, k d,min ), is certainly lower than τ * (θ d,min , k d,min ) (below, we show that τ * (0, k d,min ) = 0). In contrast, the preferred tax rate of type (θ d,min , k d,max ) is certainly higher than τ * (θ d,min , k d,min ). This agent benefits from redistribution not only because he has the same low productivity as voter (θ d,min , k d,min ), but also because high levels of redistribution increase the relevance of his high social class. Finally, the preferred tax rate of type (0, k d,max ) is certainly above τ * (0, k d,min ) and below τ * (θ d,min , k d,max ). However, its ordering with respect to τ * (θ d,min , k d,min ) remains ambiguous and depends on two conflicting forces.
On the one hand, type (0, k d,max ) is less favorable to taxation than type (θ d,min , k d,min ) as the former is a net loser in terms of monetary redistribution, while the latter is a net gainer.
On the other hand, type (0, k d,max ) is more favorable to taxation than type (θ d,min , k d,min ), as the former wants to protect his advantage in terms of social class, which the latter would rather eliminate. Figure 1 . Agents' preferred tax rate as a function of their types.
We can now characterize agents' preferred level of taxation and study how this is influenced by social concerns. To this goal, it is convenient to focus on each of the four social groups separately.
Working Class. If θ d ≤ 0 and k d ≤ 0, the optimal level of taxation in the absence of social concerns is τ * B (θ d ) = d −1 (−θ d )/dτ (cf. (7) and Remark 1). Because the utility function of these voters is strictly concave (see expression (8)), τ * B (θ d ) remains the unique optimal level of taxation even in the presence of social concerns for all those voters for whom the third term in (7) is equal to 0. More precisely, these are the types (θ d , k d ) such that
Then, for every productivity level θ d ≤ 0, define
By construction, as long as h(θ d ) > k d,min , the preferred tax rate of type (θ d , h(θ d )) is the same as in the benchmark model without social concerns. Because h(0) = 0 and h(·) is nondecreasing in θ d , Proposition 1 implies that types (θ d , k d ) with k d > h(θ d ) have a preferred level of taxation that is higher than the one of the benchmark model. For these types social concerns reinforce economic voting. On the contrary, the preferred level of taxation of all
is lower than the benchmark. 18 The preferences of these agents are mostly driven by social-class voting, which pushes them to reduce the negative impact their low social class has in determining status. The negative orthant of Figure 2 highlights these two groups respectively in red and blue when (τ ) = τ 2 .
Nouveau riche. For types θ d > 0 and k d ≤ 0, social concerns unambiguously push against redistribution. Taxation simultaneously decreases the relevance of consumption (the dimension over which these individuals are strong) and increases the relevance of social class (the dimension over which they are weak). As a result, τ * (θ d , k d ) = τ * B (θ d ) = 0 for every voter in this group.
New poors. For types θ d ≤ 0 and k d > 0, the situation is opposite to the one of the nouveau riche. Thus, these individuals support higher tax rates:
Working Class Nouveau Riche New Poors θ d k d Figure 2 . The effect of social concerns on agents' preferred tax rate.
Elite. In the benchmark model, the optimal tax rate of voters in the elite (θ d > 0 and k d > 0) is equal to 0. The presence of social concerns can thus only (weakly) raise their preferred level of taxation. 19 No matter whether their preferred tax rate is an interior or corner solution, Proposition 1 implies that for all productivity levels θ d ∈ (0, θ d,max ], we can find a social class h(θ d ) such that all voters (θ d , k d ) with k d ≤ h(θ d ) have a preferred tax rate equal to zero (cf. grey area in the positive orthant of Figure 2 ). Instead, voters (θ d , k d ) with k d > h(θ d ) have a preferred tax rate greater than zero (cf. red area in the positive orthant of Figure 2 ). For these latter voters, social-class voting dominates: despite being net losers from the redistributive scheme, they demand a positive taxation to preserve their advantage in terms of social class.
The presence of social concerns may thus increase or decrease an individual's preferred level of taxation depending on his relative standing in the society. The relationship between the relevance of social concerns (as measured by η), the incidence of economic voting and social-class voting, and agents' preferred tax rate can be summarized as follows (see also 
and non-increasing in η otherwise, and (iv) for any
is non-decreasing in η. Figure 2 can guide some cross-country comparisons. Consider for instance two countries A and B that are similarly heterogeneous in terms of productivity (hence, income). However, in country A social classes do not play much of a role. This could be the case for "young" countries in which social stratification based on inherited background is not particularly strong (e.g., the US or Australia). Our model dictates that in country A the main driver of social status is income. Figure 2 then shows that if the vast majority of voters concentrates around the x-axis, both the elite and the working class are highly homogeneous in their redistributive preferences. The elite is solidly against taxation, whereas the working class is largely in favor of it. In other words, and as already discussed, social concerns amplify economic voting and the latter describes the behavior of the large majority of the population.
Proposition 2 and

Suppose instead that in country B social stratification has a longer tradition and it
is thus more important (e.g., Europe, India, Japan). Voters thus spread out more evenly across the two dimensions. In Figure 2 , this corresponds to a situation in which a significant mass of voters concentrates around the y-axis as well. Then, we should observe significant deviations from economic voting in both directions: a sizable fraction of the elite supports redistribution while, at the same time, many members of the working class oppose it. In country B, social-class voting is thus a more relevant phenomenon. 20 20 Applying a symmetric argument, a mean preserving spread of the distribution of productivity holding On a similar vein, we can also perform cross-country comparisons with respect to the relevance of social status considerations (i.e., the parameter η). Let countries C and D be identical in the distribution of types, but say that status concerns are more relevant in country C than in country D. Point (ii) in Proposition 2 indicates that the fraction of the working class that engages in social-class voting would be the same in both countries, whereas the fraction of the elite that follows social-class voting would be (weakly) larger in country C. Moreover, as highlighted by points (iii) and (iv) in Proposition 2, a change in η also modifies voters' optimal tax rate. In particular, and referring to Figure 2 , any voter in the blue (red) area of country C will have a lower (higher) preferred tax rate than the same citizen in country D.
Because social concerns affect voters' preferred level of taxation, they also impact the level of polarization concerning redistributive policies. Let polarization be the difference between the average preferred tax rate of the voters who are more favorable to redistribution and the average preferred tax rate of the voters who more strongly oppose it. 21 Proposition 1 implies that these two groups of voters are respectively given by the new poors and by the nouveau riche. Formally, define polarization as:
where τ * + (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) and τ * − (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) are respectively the highest and lowest preferred tax rate of voter (θ d , k d ). 22 fixed the level of social stratification would amplify economic voting. Instead, shocks that shift the entire distribution of productivity have no consequences on individual preferences as the latter are determined by the voter's relative position in the society, which remains unaffected. 21 Other definitions of polarization are possible. For instance, one could consider the difference between the average preferred tax rate in the xth percentile of most productive voters and the average preferred tax rate in the xth percentile of least productive voters. In this case, the results of Proposition 3 would hold true if, given distribution F d (θ d , k d ), the former group of voters is sufficiently concentrated in the red region of Figure 2 , and the latter in the blue and grey regions. In turn, this would be the case if the marginal distribution of productivity, F θ (θ), is not excessively left-skewed. 22 Obviously, if τ * (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) is a singleton, then τ *
Proposition 3. Polarization Π(η, σ θ , σ k ) is weakly increasing in η. Furthermore, polarization is weakly increasing in σ θ (weakly decreasing in σ k ) if σ θ < λσ k .
To understand Proposition 3, note that when the relevance of social concerns η increases, the function h(θ d ) remains constant for all types θ d ≤ 0 (see point (ii) in Proposition 2). As such, new poors want higher levels of redistribution, while the nouveau riche still support no redistribution (see Figure 2 ). Hence, polarization goes up, which is line with the evidence discussed in Section 2.
Proposition 3 further says that polarization is increasing with the dispersion in productivity (hence, income) when such dispersion is not too high (σ θ < λσ k ). However, when the standard deviation in productivity becomes larger than the one in social class, the proposition also allows for a reversal in the relationship between income dispersion and polarization.
To gain intuition for this possibility, consider an increase in σ θ . Keeping the voter's type fixed, his preferred level of taxation depends on σ θ only insofar this parameter affects statusseeking considerations (cf. the last term in (7)). We can thus identify two effects. On the one hand, social weight W c goes up and thus economic voting becomes more important.
As a result, polarization increases: individuals with low productivity and high social status support higher levels of redistribution, while individuals with high productivity and low status still want no redistribution. On the other hand, social weight W k decreases and thus social-class voting becomes less important. Because social-class voting is one of the reasons pushing the new poors to support high levels of redistribution, the optimal level of taxation of these voters may decrease, thus lowering the degree of polarization in the society. This can occur only if an increase in σ θ does not boost economic voting a lot, which can be the case when σ θ is high. 23 The results in show that this correlation is subject to significant differences across countries. Focusing on preferences about redistribution and welfare spending, Barth et al. (2015) find that inequality has no effect on polarization, whereas Haggard et al. (2013) show that in developing countries higher levels of inequality may even decrease the demand for redistribution and thus dampen polarization. Proposition 3 suggests that this cross-country heterogeneity could be potentially explained by taking into account the two opposing channels we just described.
Interclass Coalitions and Aggregation of Preferences
As discussed in Section 4, social concerns introduce disagreement among voters who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes. In spite of this heterogeneity, our model allows for a smooth aggregation of individual preferences within the working class.
To clarify, denote with ϕ (τ, θ d , k d ) the derivative of the utility function of voter (θ d , k d ) with respect to τ ,
Pick any voter (θ d , k d ) in the working class with preferred tax rate equal to τ (θ d , k d ) ∈ (0, 1). 24 Then, we must have ϕ (τ * (θ d , k d ) , θ d , k d ) = 0. Furthermore, it is easy to show that τ * (θ d , k d ) must also be the unique preferred tax rate of all voters (θ d , k d ) in the working class for whom ϕ (τ * (θ d , k d ) , θ d , k d ) = 0. Based on this insight, define the set
with
24 Such voter always exists. Consider the set {(θ d , k d ) : θ d < 0, k d = h(θ d )}. If θ d < 0, h(θ d ) is continuous and h(0) = 0. Thus, the set is non-empty. For any voter in such a set, the strict concavity of the utility function (cf. (8) ) and the assumptions we made on function (·) ensure that the optimal tax rate is unique and pinned down by the first order necessary condition.
For any k d ≤ 0, the definition of Q(·) implies that ϕ (τ * (θ d , k d ) , ϑ (θ d , k d , k d ) , k d ) = 0.
If ϑ(θ d , k d , k d ) ≤ 0, this mapping identifies a voter in class k d ≤ 0 with the same preferred tax rate as type (θ d , k d ). Then, Q (·) captures the marginal adjustment in the productivity dimension that is needed to compensate for a marginal change in social class and guarantee that the optimal tax rate does not change. Noticeably, such marginal adjustment is constant in k d . In other words, function ϑ(·) is linear in k d .
By varying k d ∈ [k d,min , 0], function ϑ(θ d , k d , ·) identifies the interclass coalition of voters in the working class, whose preferred tax rate is τ * (θ d , k d ). 25 In this respect, Q (·) measures the heterogeneity in the productivity levels of the members of such coalition. If Q (·) is small, the set of voters who share the same preferred tax rate is relatively homogeneous in terms of productivity. In contrast, if Q (·) is large, the coalition includes voters with more heterogeneous productivity levels. Moreover, because Q (·) ≥ 0, the coalition is composed by relatively less productive individuals in low social classes and relatively more productive individuals in high social classes. Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that interclass coalitions are heterogeneous in terms of productivity even if productivity is identically distributed across all classes: Q (·) > 0 even if θ d and k d are independently distributed.
A change in the relevance of social concerns η impacts on Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ), and thus on the composition of a coalition, through two different channels: directly because Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) depends on η, and indirectly because Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) also depends on τ * (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ), which, in turn, depends on η. Whereas the first channel implies a positive correlation between η and Q(·), the second channel can go in both directions depending on the voter we are considering (cf. Proposition 2, points (iii) and (iv)). Nonetheless, if the social class of a voter is sufficiently high, then the heterogeneity in productivity levels of the coalition that supports his preferred tax rate unambiguously widens as the relevance of social concerns increases. Then, Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) is increasing in η.
Interclass coalitions can be constructed within the working class because the utility function of these voters is everywhere strictly concave. Thus, if the tax rate τ solves ϕ (τ, θ d , k d ) = 0, then it necessarily is the preferred policy of voter (θ d , k d ). However, as we move out from the working class, voters' utility functions are no longer everywhere strictly concave in τ . Thus, the optimal tax rate may not be unique and the first order condition may not identify it. blue line groups all individuals whose preferred tax rate coincides with the preferred tax rate of type (θ d , k d ), while the red line does the same for types who share preferred tax rate τ * (θ d , k d ). The two lines have slope 1/Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ) and 1/Q(θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k ).
It is immediate to verify that Proposition 4 also extends to all voters [θ d,min , θ d,max ) × [k d,min , k d,max ] provided that the relevance of social concerns is sufficiently low. Moreover, because the median productivity is below the average productivity, the previous construction can be used to identify an interclass coalition with the property that half of the population has a preferred tax rate greater than the one of the voters in such coalition, and the other half has a preferred tax rate lower than that. In the discussion that follows, we implicitly assume that η is small enough to guarantee that these results hold true.
The previous steps can then be used to characterize the political equilibrium of a Down- and such that τ * (θ d , k d ) ∈ (0, 1), function ϑ (·) and Proposition 1 enable us to split the population in two groups: those with a preferred tax rate higher than τ * (θ d , k d ) (i.e., voters with productivity below ϑ(·)) and those with a preferred tax rate below it (i.e., voters with productivity above ϑ(·)). In other words, we can collapse one of the two dimensions of voters' heterogeneity. Within the resulting unidimensional space, we can follow standard arguments to conclude that the political game has a unique voting equilibrium in which both candidates announce the preferred tax rate of the "median voter" in the unidimensional space which derives from (13) . We denote this tax rate with τ V E . 26 Formally, let ψ : [θ d,min , 0) × [k d,min , k d,max ] → [0, 1] be a function that, for any type (θ d , k d ), measures the mass of individuals with preferred tax rate above τ * (θ d , k d ):
The equilibrium tax rate of the political game, τ V E , coincides with the preferred tax rate of any type (θ * 
The equilibrium tax rate and the identity of the decisive voter can thus be obtained solving the system of non-linear equations (16)- (17) . From an operational point of view, this can be done by deriving the preferred tax rate τ * (θ d , k d,min ) of increasingly more productive individuals and search for the productivity level that satisfies (17) .
Note that social concerns influence the voting equilibrium in two ways. First, as described by Proposition 2, they change the preferred tax rate of each individual, hence of the decisive voter. Second, they modify the identity of the decisive voter (θ * d , k d,min ) modifying interclass 26 Consider any pair of announcements by politicians in which at least one of the two tax rates is not τ = τ V E . Then, any candidate who is winning with probability lower than 1 (such candidate must exist and cannot be already announcing τ V E ) could deviate to τ V E and be strictly better off. Thus, such profile of policy announcements cannot be an equilibrium of the political game. 27 Obviously, if ψ(θ * d , k d,min ) = 1/2, then ψ(ϑ (θ * d , k d,min , k d ) , k d ) = 1/2 for any k d . This indeterminacy does not play any role in our analysis. coalitions (i.e., they affect function Q(·), see Proposition 4). If any of the parameters η, σ θ and σ k is equal to zero, Q(θ d , k d ) ≡ 0. Then, the identity of the decisive voter is constant and equal to (θ m d , k d,min ) and the second effect described above can be ignored. This yields the following Remark. Thus, social concerns reinforce economic voting and the equilibrium tax rate converges to a higher value. Finally, if there is no heterogeneity in terms of productivity (σ θ = 0), individuals who are less productive than the average do not enjoy any redistributive benefit, but taxation is still distortionary. Then, all voters support a tax rate equal to 0 which thus emerges as the voting equilibrium. 28 Now suppose that Q(·) is bounded away from 0 and that the assumption of Proposition 5 is satisfied (i.e., η ≤ η). In this case a change in the relevance of social concerns η impacts both the preferences of voters and the composition of interclass coalitions. Focusing on this latter effect, note that, by (17) , an increase in η modifies the mass of voters with preferred 28 The results in Remark 2 hold true also in the limit as each one of the parameters η, σ θ or σ k goes to 0. level of taxation above τ * (θ * d , k d,min ) by:
Because k d,min is the lowest social class, (18) is positive if and only if ∂Q(θ * d , k d,min )/∂η is.
Suppose ∂Q(θ * d , k d,min )/∂η is indeed positive. Then an increase in η raises above 50% the mass of voters in favor of tax rates higher than (θ * d , k d,min ). To restore (17) , the productivity of the decisive voter must decrease. Moreover, if the class of the initial decisive voter is h(θ * d ), Proposition 2 implies that the new decisive voter will support higher levels of redistribution.
As a result, both the change in the identity of the decisive voter and the change in his preferences push toward an increase in the level of redistribution. Since this holds true for any initial decisive voter with k d,min = h(θ * d ), the following result also holds true. implies that an increase in η makes the decisive voter more adverse to redistribution. Hence, τ V E tends to decrease. However, if the assumption in Proposition 5 applies, an increase in η also decreases the productivity of the decisive voter. 29 Hence, τ V E tends to increase.
Depending on which of the two effects prevails, the equilibrium level of redistribution may thus decrease or increase.
Conclusions
People care about their relative standing in society and status-seeking behavior has been proven to be an important driver of economic decisions in a variety of settings.
In this paper, we investigated how social status concerns may affect voters' preferences for redistribution. We showed that the social stratification may lead individuals who have different levels of productivity (and thus different gross incomes) to share the same desired level of taxation. This happens because voters' preferences toward redistribution are shaped not only by their monetary interests (economic voting), but also by their desire to preserve/overcome the advantages/disadvantages they experience in terms of social class (social-class voting). We also showed that social concerns increase the level of polarization concerning redistributive policies. Finally, we showed that when the impact of social concerns is not too large, the coalitions of voters who share the same preferred tax rate have a simple structure and this can be used to characterize the voting equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider utility function v(τ, g | θ d , k d ). The function is twice continuously differentiable and its indifference curves are path-connected (this follows from the fact that the function is continuous in τ and, furthermore, g enters additively linearly). Furthermore, observe that Gans and Smart, 1996) .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let the same argument as before and conclude that the preferred tax rate is increasing in η (in this case the fact that the last term in (7) is positive follows directly from the fact that θ d > 0). Suppose instead that τ * = 0. Focus first on the nouveau riche (k d ≤ 0). Obviously (7) is negative for all τ independently of the value of η. Thus, if k d ≤ 0, a tax rate equal to zero is the unique maximizer, τ * (θ d , k d ) = {0} for all η. Now consider types in the elite, 
If the right-hand side of (19) is negative for allτ ∈ (0, 1], it remains negative for all η ∈ R + .
Thus τ = 0 is the unique best response. Instead, if the right-hand side of (19) is positive for someτ * (this is possible if and only if k d > θ d ), we can find η > η such that forτ * the inequality is reversed for any η ≥ η (η is defined as the supremum of ηs for which (19) holds. Since the right-hand side of (19) is positive this supremum is well defined).
Then, if η ≥ η , there exists τ * > 0 such that τ * ∈ τ * (θ d , k d | η) for all η ≥ η . In either cases, τ * (θ d , h(θ d ) | η) is non-decreasing in η. By construction, it is immediate to verify that provided that η > 0, h(θ d ) is constant in θ d ≤ 0 and non-increasing in η when θ d > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We know that any voter (θ d , k d ) with θ d > 0 and k d ≤ 0 has a unique preferred tax rate equal to 0 for any profile of parameters (see proof of Proposition 2). The proposition thus follows if we can show that for any (θ d , k d ) with θ d ≤ 0 and k d > 0, max{τ ∈ τ * (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k )} is weakly increasing in η and weakly increasing in σ θ (weakly decreasing in σ k ) when σ θ < λσ k .
The first result follows from Proposition 2 after noticing that k d > 0 ≥ h(θ d ) (recall that h(·)
is weakly increasing in θ d and equal 0 at θ d = 0). Now consider changes in σ θ (the proof for σ k is analogous). At τ = 0, (7) is positive for any type (θ d , k d ) with θ d ≤ 0 and k d > 0. Thus 0 ∈ τ * (θ d , k d ). Differentiating (7) with respect to σ θ we get that ∂ 2 v(τ,τ θ|θ d ,k d )
Since θ d ≤ 0 and k d > 0, the previous inequality is always satisfied if λσ k ≥ σ θ . Monotone comparative static results (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and the steps in the proof of Proposition 1) imply that max{τ ∈ τ * (θ d , k d | η, σ θ , σ k )} is non-decreasing in σ θ .
Proof of Proposition 4.
Because the utility function of voters is strictly concave, τ * (θ d , k d ) is a singleton. Then
Such derivative is positive if ∂τ * ∂η ≥ 0. By Proposition 2, this is the case if k d ≥ h(θ d ).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Let η = 0. Then, Q(·) ≡ 0 and the utility function of all voters is strictly concave in τ . Thus, each voter has a unique preferred tax rate and, for any θ d < 0, this is the rate τ ∈ (0, 1) that solves ϕ(τ, θ d , k d ) = 0 (recall that in the benchmark case, we rule out the possibility that some voters have a preferred tax rate equal to 1 by assuming that function (τ ) is sufficiently steep). Because θ m d < 0, this property holds true for more than 50% of voters.
Moreover, when η = 0, voters' utility functions do not depend on social class and satisfy the single crossing property in τ with respect to θ d . Then, standard results (cf. Gans and Smart, 1996) show that the voting equilibrium coincides with the unique policy preferred by the voter with median productivity. Thus, (16) and (17) Define
otherwise.
If η ≤ η 1 (θ d , k d )/2, then τ * (θ d , k d ), the unique preferred tax rate of voter (θ d , k d ), is strictly between 0 and 1 and it is the unique tax rate τ that satisfies ϕ(τ, θ d , k d ) = 0. 30 Furthermore, (8) implies that for any voter (θ d , k d ) ∈ R − × R ++ , we can define
If η ≤ η 2 (θ d , k d )/2, (8) is negative for every τ ∈ [τ * (θ d , k d ), 1]. 31 By Proposition 1, if η ≤ η 1 (θ d , k d )/2 we know that the preferred tax rates of types (θ d , k d ) with k d ≥ k d must be weakly higher than the unique preferred tax rate of voter (θ d , k d ), τ * (θ d , k d ). If η ≤ min{η 1 (θ d , k d )/2, η 2 (θ d , k d )/2}, since the utility function is strictly concave in τ for all τ ∈ [τ * (θ d , k d ), 1], the optimal tax rate of voter (θ d , k d ) must be unique and it is either 1 or the solution to ϕ(τ, θ d , k d ) = 0. To rule out the first possibility, we can require that this threshold is bounded away from 0 for all θ d . Moreover, η * (θ d ) is a continuous 30 The threshold guarantees that for these voters ϕ(·) is not negative for all τ . It can be shown that, because of our assumptions on d (1)/dτ , ϕ(·) cannot be always positive for all τ . 31 The threshold guarantees that (8) is negative for all τ independently of the actual voter.
Integrating over the set of social classes, we obtain the mass of voters in the overall population with preferred tax rate above or below τ * θ † d , k d,max . As argued in the main text, in a Downsian model of electoral competition both candidates propose the tax rate preferred by voter (θ † d , k d,max ). This is also the preferred tax rate of any voter (ϑ(θ † d , k d,max , k d ), k d ). By construction, such tax rate is the unique value that solves ϕ τ, ϑ(θ † d , k d,max , k d ), k d = 0. The Proposition follows by defining ϑ(θ † d , k d,max , k d,min ) = θ * d .
